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With this paper we seek to contribute to the literature on the relation between ￿-
nance and growth. We argue that most studies in the ￿eld fail to measure the quality
of ￿nancial intermediation but rather resort to using proxies on the size of ￿nancial
systems. Moreover, cross-country comparisons su￿er from the disadvantage that sys-
tematic di￿erences between markedly di￿erent economies may drive the result that
￿nance matters. To circumvent these two problems we examine the importance of
the quality of banks’ ￿nancial intermediation in the regions of one economy only:
Germany. To approximate the quality of ￿nancial intermediation we use cost e￿-
ciency estimates derived with stochastic frontier analysis. We ￿nd that the quantity
of supplied credit is indeed insigni￿cant when a measure of intermediation quality
is included. In turn, the e￿ciency of intermediation is robust, also after exclud-
ing banks likely to operate in multiple regions and distinguishing between di￿erent
banking pillars active in Germany.
Keywords: Finance-growth nexus, ￿nancial intermediation, regional growth
JEL: G21, G28, O4, R11Non-technical summary
Already in 1911, Joseph Schumpeter advocated that a well-developed ￿nancial
system improves the allocation of ￿nancial capital. Intermediaries help to identify the
most pro￿table investment projects, thereby improving productivity and, ultimately,
economic welfare. Since the early 1990’s, empirical evidence in support of what is
known today as the ￿nance-growth nexus is increasingly available.
But the empirical evidence su￿ers from two important caveats. First, most stud-
ies employ the volume of bank credit relative to national income to grasp ￿nancial
development. In contrast, we hypothesize that it is especially the quality of ￿nancial
institutions that matters for economic growth. Second, the majority of studies is of
a cross-country nature. But the required assumption of a homogeneous production
technology across markedly di￿erent economies may be overly heroic.
Our suggestions in this paper are twofold. First, we use an alternative measure
derived from individual bank data to approximate the quality of ￿nancial intermedi-
ation: cost e￿ciency. Second, we analyze the regions of one economy only: Germany.
With regard to the former, we argue that well-developed banks successfully min-
imize non-random deviations from optimal costs due to poor in- and output choices.
Cost ine￿ciency grasps poor information gathering skills ex ante and ex post the
funding of projects as far as less able banks incur higher costs in the longer run,
for example due to higher write-o￿s of loans that eventually default due to poor
selection and monitoring of the creditor. Regarding the latter suggestion, we ensure
with our regional choice that structural di￿erences known to in￿uence growth, such
as legal and cultural standards, are homogeneous. More speci￿cally, we use data on
97 economic planning regions in Germany between 1994 and 2003.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, we ￿nd that cost e￿ciency,
averaged across all universal banking groups per region, has a signi￿cant and positive
in￿uence on growth. An increasing ability to channel ￿nancial funds from savers to
depositors e￿ciently fosters economic growth.
Second, for this sample the traditionally used volume of credit variable is insignif-
icant. Apparently, an expansion of loan volumes has per se no signi￿cant impact on
growth.
Third, the positive relation between e￿ciency and growth is robust after ex-
cluding all nationally active banks, which are likely to operate beyond their region
of residence. Hence, the relevance of quality and the insigni￿cance of sheer volume
remains valid.
Fourth, the distinction between public and private banks highlights the hetero-
geneity of German banking. While both groups’ e￿ciency continue to exhibit a
positive in￿uence on growth, we can only ￿nd a signi￿cant average e￿ciency e￿ect
for private banks. Possibly, the role of public banks is too di￿erent across Germany’s
regions to obtain a statistically signi￿cant e￿ect for the entirety of Germany. Most
importantly we conclude that to promote growth it is the quality of ￿nancial inter-
mediation that requires attention rather than a mere expansion of loan volumes.Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung
Bereits 1911 argumentierte Joseph Schumpeter, dass ein gut entwickeltes Banken-
system die e￿ziente Allokation von Finanzmitteln f￿rdert. Die bessere Auswahl pro-
￿tabler Investitionsprojekte durch Intermedi￿re tr￿gt zur Steigerung der Produk-
tivit￿t bei und f￿hrt zu positiven Wohlfahrtse￿ekten. Zunehmend vorhandene em-
pirische Evidenz best￿tigt diesen Zusammenhang.
Diese empirischen Studien leiden jedoch unter zwei Schw￿chen. Zum einen wird
der Entwicklungsstand eines Finanzsystems oftmals durch das aggregierte Kreditvo-
lumen gemessen. Es ist jedoch vielmehr die Qualit￿t der Intermediationst￿tigkeit,
welche einen Wachstumse￿ekt hat. Zum anderen handelt es sich meist um interna-
tionale Studien. L￿nder￿bergreifende Studien erfordern jedoch die sehr restriktive
Annahme einer identischen Produktionsfunktion f￿r alle Volkswirtschaften.
In diesem Beitrag werden diese beiden Schw￿chen vermieden. Zum einen nutzen
wir ein Ma￿ f￿r die Qualit￿t erbrachter Finanzdienstleistungen: bankspezi￿sche
Kostene￿zienz. Zum anderen analysieren wir die Regionen innerhalb einer ￿konomie:
Deutschland.
Wir vermuten einerseits, dass gut entwickelte regionale Bankensysteme erfolg-
reich Kostenabweichungen vom Optimum minimieren. Kostene￿zienz erfasst die
F￿higkeit zur Au￿￿sung von Informationsasymmetrien vor und nach der Projekt-
￿nanzierung insofern, als dass weniger e￿ziente Banken langfristig systematisch
h￿here Kosten, z. B. auf Grund von Abschreibung schlecht selektierter und kon-
trollierter Kredite, haben. Durch die Wahl lokaler Regionen stellen wir sicher, dass
wichtige Faktoren, wie z.B. Rechtsprechung und kulturelle Werte, zwischen analy-
sierten R￿umen hinreichend homogen sind und damit die Annahme einer identischen
Produktionfunktion weitestgehend gew￿hrleistet ist. Konkret nutzen wir hier die 97
Raumordnungsregionen (ROR) in Deutschland f￿r den Zeitraum von 1994 bis 2003.
Unsere Ergebnisse lassen sich wie folgt zusammenfassen: Erstens zeigt sich, dass
die ￿ber alle Bankengruppen gemittelte Kostene￿zienz je ROR einen positiv sig-
ni￿kanten Ein￿u￿ auf das regionale Wachstum hat. Eine h￿here Qualit￿t ange-
botener Finanzdienstleistungen steigert das Wirtschaftswachstum.
Zweitens ￿nden wir f￿r unsere Stichprobe, dass das ￿blicherweise spezi￿zierte
Ma￿ Kreditvolumen nicht signi￿kant ist. Anscheinend hat eine schlichte Erh￿hung
der Kreditvergabe keinen Ein￿uss auf das lokale Wirtschaftswachstum.
Drittens, unsere Ergebnisse werden auch nach Ausschluss aller national aktiven,
und somit nicht einer ROR eindeutig zurechenbaren, Banken best￿tigt. Dies unter-
mauert die Bedeutung unseres Qualit￿tsma￿es.
Viertens zeigt die Unterscheidung zwischen Volumen- und Qualit￿tse￿ekten f￿r
lokale nicht￿￿entliche Banken, dass die Qualit￿t einen positiv signi￿kanten Ein￿u￿
auf das Wachstum hat, w￿hrend der Volumene￿ekt signi￿kant negativ ist. F￿r ￿f-
fentliche Banken k￿nnen wir dagegen keine entsprechenden signi￿kanten Ein￿￿sse
feststellen. M￿glicherweise ist die Rolle ￿￿entlicher Banken in den Regionen Deutsch-
lands zu unterschiedlich, um einen statistisch signi￿kanten E￿ekt f￿r das gesamte
Land zu identi￿zieren. Unser wichtigstes Ergebnis ist jedoch die Best￿tigung, dass
in der Tat die Qualit￿t von Finanzdienstleistungen f￿r wirtschaftliches Wachstum
von Bedeutung ist.Contents
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Is it Quantity or Quality that Matters? 1
1 Introduction
The notion that a sound ￿nancial system fosters economic growth has already been
advocated by Schumpeter (1934, 1939). Since the seminal empirical work by King
and Levine (1993), the question if and to what extent ￿nancial development spurs
economic growth experienced a renaissance. Numerous studies test Schumpeter’s
early hypotheses.2 Given the available evidence, only few economists doubt that
￿nance matters for growth today.
But in our view most studies su￿er from two major shortcomings. First, in a
Schumpeterian world it is the quality rather than the quantity of ￿nancial interme-
diation that in￿uences economic growth. However, most studies specify proxies of
￿nancial systems’ size, for example the credit to GDP ratio. Second, most studies are
of a cross-country nature, frequently sampling very di￿erent economies like the U.S.
on the one hand and Thailand on the other. Then, signi￿cant ￿nancial indicators
may partly be driven by excessively heterogeneous samples. 3
We address these problems in the following manner. First, we grasp the quality
of intermediation by using microeconomic technical e￿ciency measures derived at
the bank-level to assess banks’ abilities to convert inputs into ￿nancial products
and services. Second, we seek to reduce potential sample bias by focusing on the
regions of one industrialized country only, namely Germany. Thereby, we ensure
that many environmental factors identi￿ed as signi￿cant are fairly homogeneous in
our sample. We hypothesize that in Germany’s fragmented three-pillar system of
private and public banks the quality of ￿nancial intermediation is not only di￿erent
1m.koetter@rug.nl (M. Koetter) and michael.wedow@bundesbank.de (M. Wedow). This paper
represents the authors’ personal opinions and does not re￿ect the views of the Deutsche Bun-
desbank. We are grateful to participants of the research center’s seminar series at the Deutsche
Bundesbank, in particular Julia von Borstel, J￿rg D￿pke, Hannah S. Hempell, Heinz Herrmann,
Frank Heid, Thilo Liebig, Fred Ramb and StØphanie Stolz, for most valuable input. The feedback of
our colleagues Jaap Bos, J￿rg Breitung, Claudia Buch, Jim Kolari, Clemens Kool, Thorsten Nessi
Nestmann, Steven Ongena, Katharina Raabe and Beatrice Weder di Mauro has also been of ut-
most help to us, too. Furthermore, we are indebted to seminar participants at the XIV Tor Vergata
Conference on Banking and Finance, especially Ifthekar Hassan and Paul Wachtel. Comments by
the Research Council of the Deutsche Bundesbank, in particular those of Bronwyn Hall and Martin
Hellwig have been most helpful to us. Finally, we would like to thank seminar participants of the
GBSA workshop held at the University of Frankfurt and the Institute of Economics & Economet-
rics Seminar series at the University of Groningen. The feedback received from Franklin Allen,
Andreas Hackethal, Jan Jacobs, Robert Lensink and Jan Pieter Krahnen is highly appreciated. All
remaining errors are, of course, our own.
2For example, Rajan and Zingales (1998), Beck and Levine (2002) and Berger et al. (2004).
Review studies are Levine (2004), Thiel (2001) and Dolar and Meh (2001).
3To some extent this is merely an omitted variable bias if factors in￿uencing growth are not
controlled for. For example, La Porta et al. (1998) show that the legal system and Garretsen et al.
(2004) that cultural di￿erences in￿uence growth. However, beyond this potential omitted variable
problem we may also face the conceptual problem entailed in the assumption of a homogeneous
production function between, say, developed and less developed countries.
1across regions but also of signi￿cant importance to promote growth. 4 Our study
adds to the only two analyses that we are aware of that also seek to distinguish
between the quality and the quantity of ￿nancial intermediation, namely Lucchetti
et al. (2001) and Berger et al. (2004).
In this paper, we concentrate throughout on banks only. We do not investigate the
relative merits of banks versus markets or other intermediaries for two reasons. First,
increasingly many scholars discard the view that banks and markets are substitutes
(Merton and Bodie, 2004). Empirical evidence indicates that both markets and
institutions are integral parts of a ￿nancial system that complement each other
(Levine, 2002; Beck and Levine, 2002). Second, Germany is a role-model of a bank-
based system. Koetter et al. (2004) and Hackethal (2004) examine inasmuch the
German economy depends on banks, markets and other intermediaries to channel
funds from savers to investors. Their results con￿rm conventional wisdom: German
banks were, still are and likely remain to be of paramount importance in Germany’s
￿nancial system for the foreseeable future.
We structure the paper as follows. In section 2, we discuss the literature that
links ￿nance and growth theoretically and empirically. In section 3, we introduce
our growth speci￿cation, the methodology to derive the quality of ￿nancial interme-
diation by banks and the data used. In section 4 we present and discuss our results.
We conclude in section 5.
2 Financial Development and Growth
The question if and how ￿nancial development in￿uences real economic growth is
at the very heart of the ￿nance-growth literature. Both the available evidence and
remaining open issues are numerous and have been reviewed by Levine (2004) re-
cently. Here, we focus on two issues. The link between ￿nance and growth on the
one hand and the available empirical evidence on the other.
2.1 Theoretical Considerations
The importance of ￿nance for real economic growth is not without debate. On the
one hand, Robinson (1952) argues that ￿nancial services are provided as a reac-
tion to the demand by corporate ￿rms. In her view, ￿nance follows entrepreneurial
activity.5 Similarly, Lucas (1988) regards ￿nance an overvalued explanatory factor
in growth theory. On the other hand, economists like Gurley and Shaw (1955),
Gerschenkron (1963), Goldsmith (1969) and McKinnon (1973) ￿nd that neglecting
￿nancial development severely limits our understanding of economic growth.
Along the lines of the latter scholars there are two channels through which ￿nan-
cial development can in￿uence growth. The ￿rst is Hicksian in nature and emphasizes
the enhanced accumulation of capital through higher savings (Hicks, 1969). The sec-
ond represents a Schumpetrian point of view and centers on the improved ability of
4Private banks are commercials and cooperatives and savings banks constitute the public sector.
5This point is also known as the reverse causality critique (Boyd and Smith, 1996).
2the ￿nancial sector to increase technological progress through an e￿cient selection,
funding and monitoring of projects (Schumpeter, 1934, 1939).
We use a simplistic growth model in the vein of Pagano (1993) to illustrate these
e￿ects: the AK-model.6 Yt denotes aggregate output at time t, which is generated
with one production factor only, namely capital Kt.7 A is a positive constant that
re￿ects the current level of technology. The production function is
Yt = AKt. (1)
Here, the marginal product of capital equals total factor productivity A. Output
can only be consumed or saved so that Y = C+S. We assume that the capital stock
depreciates at a constant rate δ. Investment equals the di￿erence in capital stocks
in two subsequent periods, Kt and Kt+1:
It = Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt. (2)
We assume next that the ￿nancial goods market is in equilibrium so that aggre-
gate savings S equal aggregate investment I.8
It = ηSt. (3)
The factor η is 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 and captures the ability of the ￿nancial sector to
intermediate funds. Only a fraction of savings is converted into investments because
we assume that frictions exist when channelling funds from surplus to de￿cit units.
High values of η indicate that only little resources are wasted.
From equation (1) we know that the growth rate of output g =
Yt+1
Yt −1 depends
on the development of K. In the steady state, both capital and output grow at the
same rate. Rewriting the investment expression in equation (2) yields:
ηsAKt = Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt. (4)




Kt −1 holds in the steady state,
we suppress subscripts and write the growth rate g as:
g = ηsA − δ. (5)
Equation (5) illustrates how ￿nancial development can in￿uence growth: via a
larger fraction of income that is saved, s; via enhancing total factor productivity, A;
and via an improved quality of intermediation, η, by reducing the fraction of savings
"lost in transition". The former e￿ect relates more to the Hicksian view that better
developed ￿nancial systems are those that channel higher quantities from savers
6The AK model can easily be extended e.g. for multiple production factors or population growth.
For our illustrative purposes we prefer here a model as simple as possible.
7Here, K represents capital in a broad sense and also augments human capital (Chapter 4,
Barro and Sala-i Martin (1995)).
8Note that this re￿ects the assumption of a small, closed economy.
3to investors. In contrast, the latter two e￿ects resemble the Schumpetrian train of
thought. Better intermediaries help to reduce slack in the ￿nancial system and foster
capital productivity through investing in more pro￿table projects.
The Hicksian as well as the Schumpeterian notion entail that better developed
￿nancial systems imply lower transaction and information costs. Levine (2004) dis-
tinguishes ￿ve ways how banks accomplish these reductions: 9 (i) information collec-
tion, (ii) project monitoring, (iii) risk management, (iv) channelling savings and (v)
facilitate transactions of goods and services.
First, consider information collection. If it is costly to gather information when
making investment decisions, studies in the vein of Allen (1990) show that ￿nancial
intermediaries help to economize on search cost and thereby foster aggregate saving.
According to Morales (2003), information gathering leads to learning e￿ects. This
implies that ￿nancial intermediaries are better suited to spot entrepreneurs with the
highest potential to innovate on products, services and processes.
Second, consider monitoring. Better developed ￿nancial systems aid equity and
debt holders of ￿rms to scrutinize managers as to ensure that the latter act in the
best interest of the former. If information asymmetries exist, managers may exploit
free-rider considerations of investors in ￿nancial markets when individual investors
rely on each other to conduct costly monitoring activities. 10 The seminal model by
Diamond (1984) illuminates how banks act as delegated monitors on behalf of in-
vestors, thereby solving the free-rider problem. De la Fuente and Marin (1996) ￿nd
that banks help to enhance productivity as they are particularly suited to moni-
tor opaque, and hence information cost intensive, innovative projects. In the vein
of Schumpeter’s constructive destruction argument, Bencivenga and Smith (1993)
provide a model where banks ration credit in order to select the most pro￿table
investments, which raises capital productivity.
Third, consider risk management. Better developed ￿nancial systems help savers
and investors in three ways to enhance risk management: cross-sectional diversi￿-
cation, intertemporal diversi￿cation, and liquidity provision. The ￿rst issue follows
straight from ￿nance theory. Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) argue that intermedi-
aries foster productivity thanks to their ability to select pro￿table investments and
to assemble portfolios that ameliorate project-speci￿c shocks. While it may be too
costly for an individual investor to diversify, Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) show
how intermediaries facilitate the funding of more risky but innovative projects. The
second issue highlights intertemporal risk-sharing (Allen and Gale, 1997). Especially
in Germany’s corporate culture of long-term relations between borrowers, lenders
and owners (Elsas and Krahnen, 2004) ￿nancial intermediaries may commit to a
long-run perspective and help both savers and investors to prevent premature di-
vesture. The third issue refers to liquidity risk. The more di￿culties savers have
to convert real assets into means of exchange, the less inclined they are to give up
the direct control of their savings. This implies that either ￿nancial markets (Ben-
civenga et al., 1995), intermediaries (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) or a mixture of the
9Note again that we focus here on banks. Obviously, all of these functions may be ful￿lled by
markets or non-bank ￿nancial intermediaries, too. For a complete review of the relative merits we
refer to Levine (2004).
10Shleifer and Vishny (1997) review studies investigating the relation between corporate gover-
nance and ￿rms’ investment choices.
4two (Fecht et al., 2005) can help to insure savers against liquidity shocks, thereby
fostering investment in longer-run, illiquid and relatively risky projects.
Fourth, consider the collection and channelling of savings. Many projects require
large, indivisible funding. Collecting funds from a multitude of investors is expensive
for an individual project owner. Financial intermediaries can spread these ￿xed
costs if they execute this collection function for many savers and investors (Sirri
and Tufano, 1995). This increases aggregate savings and investment by matching
di￿erent denominations between the two.
Fifth, consider the facilitation of exchanging goods and services. Financial devel-
opment helps to establish an accepted medium of exchange. This reduces transac-
tion and information costs since these are high if non-standardized goods have to be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis in barter economies. According to Greenwood and
Smith (1996), this allows for a higher number of transactions, which is necessary
if an economy increasingly specializes. They argue that higher specialization favors
productivity gains and thereby promotes growth.
In sum, all ￿ve functions of ￿nancial intermediaries a￿ect growth via the volume
of savings and the allocation of capital to productive investments. Additionally, we
introduced a factor η which captures the amount of savings that is lost during the
intermediation process. We regard the former e￿ect primarily as a quantity e￿ect
that ￿nancial development has on growth. In contrast, we regard the latter two
e￿ects as a joint quality e￿ect of the sector’s ability to channel ￿nancial resources
e￿ciently to those investment projects that maximize return. Let us turn next to
the empirical evidence as how to measure ￿nancial development.
2.2 Empirical Evidence
Empirical analyses in the growth literature rarely specify the AK model used pre-
viously to illustrate the relation between ￿nance and growth. Most studies analyze
if and how fast per capita income y converges to its steady state. Barro and Sala-i
Martin (1995) show that the average growth rate of per capita output depends on
the initial level of per capita output, Y0.11 On this basis, Lucchetti et al. (2001)
denote what they call the reference model of the ￿nance-growth literature as
∆y = β1y0 + β2fd + β3x + , (6)
where lower case letters indicate the log of a variable, FD denotes a proxy of
￿nancial development, x is a vector of additional control variables and  is a random
error term. In equation (6), ∆y depicts the growth rate of per capita GDP. To our
knowledge none of the studies on Germany’s economic growth considers the ￿nancial
sector in the analysis (Niebuhr, 2001; Dreger and Kosfeld, 2003; Kosfeld et al.,
2005). This neglect is surprising because, to put it in terms of Levine (2004), the
evidence in support of a positive relation between ￿nancial development and growth
is remarkably robust across a whole range of alternative empirical methodologies.
11See the discussion in chapters 11 and 12, in particular their equation (11.1).
5With respect to the international evidence, the seminal contribution in the
￿nance-growth literature is King and Levine (1993). Their empirical speci￿cation
of the growth model is based on a single cross-sectional analysis under the assump-
tion of identical aggregate production functions as depicted in equation (6). Their
proxy for ￿nancial development FD equals liquid liabilities of the ￿nancial industry
relative to gross domestic product (GDP). 12 Hence, King and Levine (1993) gauge
primarily the quantity e￿ect of ￿nancial development. Additionally, they acknowl-
edge the importance of human capital accumulation, population growth, trade or
government expenditure and specify according covariates to enter x. For 77 coun-
tries during the period 1960 and 1989 and three alternative measures of economic
growth13 they ￿nd signi￿cant and large relations between ￿nancial development and
growth.
Many empirical studies of the growth-￿nance nexus (Demetriades and Hussein,
1996; Da Rin and Hellmann, 2002) proxy FD by a variation of these initially sug-
gested measures. Levine et al. (2000) extend earlier analyses regarding estimation
techniques and data coverage. Their results con￿rm earlier ￿ndings: a signi￿cant
and strong in￿uence of ￿nancial development on growth. They conclude that the
evidence on the importance of ￿nance for growth is robust.
The available evidence is criticized by Lucchetti et al. (2001) primarily for the
choice of proxies of ￿nancial development. They stress two issues. First, the volume
of credit intermediated is only an indirect measure of the Schumpeter argument that
better developed ￿nancial systems enjoy less frictions in the intermediation process
and foster additionally the rate of return through better project selection and mon-
itoring. Secondly, absolute measures of credit volume are subject to simultaneity
problems, initially pointed out by Robinson (1952), to a much larger extent than
a relative measure of the quality with which banks perform their intermediation
task. In a nutshell, credit volume may simply be positively correlated with growth
because in an expanding economy ￿rms increase their demand for ￿nancial funds.
Lucchetti et al. (2001) ￿nd indeed that both the quantity of credit and the quality of
banks as measured by cost e￿ciency have signi￿cant in￿uence on regional growth,
respectively. The only additional study that we are aware of that also distinguishes
more explicitly between the quantity and quality e￿ect of ￿nancial development is
Berger et al. (2004). For a sample of 49 nations they do ￿nd a positive and signif-
icantly di￿erent e￿ect of bank e￿ciency on growth during 1993 and 2000. In sum,
both studies suggest that the alternative channels as to how ￿nancial development
matters for growth should be separated: quantity versus quality.
A second critique of most international evidence is related to the cross-country
nature of these studies. Failure to account for systematic di￿erences across coun-
tries leads to biased results. Intuitively, comparing growth rates and the volume
of cumulative loans to GDP between developed and less-developed countries may
yield spurious results (Rioja and Valev, 2004). While the identi￿cation of additional
control variables is an important progress in the ￿nance-growth literature, an al-
ternative strategy is to compare regions with reasonably akin economic structures.
12King and Levine (1993) construct two additional proxies: credit supplied by central versus
commercial banks and funds lend to the private and the public sector. These two measures provide
additional information about the sources and directions of ￿nancial funds.
13Mean rate of real GDP per capita growth, mean rate of per capita capital stock growth and
total productivity growth.
6One of the few studies embarking on this train of thought is Jayaratne and Strahan
(1996). They examine the relation between branching deregulation in the U.S. and
its impact on state growth. They ￿nd that deregulation improved the quality of
lending, measured by individual banks’ shares of non-performing loans, thereby fos-
tering capital accumulation. With regard to European evidence we are only aware
of Italian studies. Besides Lucchetti et al. (2001), Guiso and Zingales (2002) use
survey data on loan applicants’ success to receive a loan as a proxy for ￿nancial
development. They ￿nd that higher ￿nancial development fosters entrepreneurial
activity, enhances competition in the non-￿nancial sector and results in higher cor-
porate growth. These studies suggest that after eliminating a range of reasons for
systematic di￿erences between regions it is the quality of ￿nancial intermediation
that spurs growth.
In sum, theory suggests that well-developed banks should spur growth via a
quantity and a quality e￿ect. However, the empirical literature did not yet address
the issue as how to measure these two di￿erent channels more directly. We turn next
to our methodology as how to measure regional growth in Germany.
3 Methodology
Our primary concern in this paper is perfectly in line with one agenda point for
future research in Levine (2004): The necessity to develop better proxies for ￿nancial
development. We begin with our speci￿cation of a growth model and subsequently
discuss the measurement of bank e￿ciency as a proxy for intermediation quality.
3.1 Growth Speci￿cation
A crucial assumption of cross-sectional growth studies in the vein of equation (6)
is that production functions are supposed to be homogeneous across analyzed re-
gions. In our view, it is most likely that such an assumption is overly heroic due to
unobserved country-speci￿c e￿ects. 14 While using alternative samples of more ho-
mogeneous regions within one country partly alleviates the problem, Islam (1995)
suggests to approach the problem more directly. He advocates the use of panel es-
timators to relax the restrictive assumption of homogeneous production functions
across regions. This approach avoids the bias of estimated coe￿cients when omitting
unobservable region-speci￿c e￿ects if these are correlated with the error. Further-
more, Levine (2004) notes that cross-sectional estimation of mean growth rates ne-
glects the information contained in the time variation and forgoes additional degrees
of freedom, which are available when exploiting longitudinal data. Therefore, we use
in this study panel data and estimation techniques.
Another decisive advantage of a panel approach relates to potential simultaneity
problems of ￿nancial development indicators and growth. The use of endogenous
regressors leads to estimations that su￿er from inconsistency and bias, which requires
the speci￿cation of suited instrument variables. Levine et al. (2000) stress that panel
data enables us to control for endogenous explanatory variables insofar as dynamic
14This issue relates to our second concern: excessive heterogeneity in the data.
7panel data estimators in the vein of Arellano and Bond (1991) have been developed
to address the potential simultaneity bias directly. They exploit the information
contained in panel data by choosing lagged level variables as instruments as to solve
the issue. Moreover, they allow us to explicitly test the validity of chosen instruments.
We follow Islam (1995) and Levine et al. (2000) and specify the reduced form of
a growth model in levels as a dynamic panel model. The regression equation is:
yi,t = αyi,t−1 + βfdi,t + γxi,t + µi + i,t. (7)
As previously, all variables in lower cases are denoted in logarithms. We amend
time indicators t and in addition, FD contains now two measures: the volume FDV
and the quality of ￿nancial development FDQ. The former resembles the well-known
speci￿cation of bank credit volume relative to GDP in the ￿nance-growth literature.
We deal with the measurement of the latter below in section 3.2. We specify a vector
of further control variables, x, to contain human capital HC and the growth rate
of the working population ETG. µi is an unobserved region-speci￿c e￿ect and 
represents the error term, where the latter is i,t ∼ iid(0, σ2
), independent of each
other and among themselves.
Equation (7) cannot be estimated directly because the lagged endogenous vari-
able is correlated with the unobserved group e￿ects µi. Thus, we have to eliminate
the latter. To this end the Arellano-Bond estimator transforms equation (7) by tak-
ing ￿rst di￿erences to yield:15
∆yi,t = α∆yi,t−1 + β∆fdi,t + γ∆xi,t + ∆i,t. (8)
The implementation of equation (8) is not straightforward because the di￿er-
enced error term and lagged dependent variable, E[∆yi,t−1,∆i,t] 6= 0, are now cor-
related by construction. Under the assumption that the i,t are not autocorrelated,
Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest to employ lagged levels as instruments for ∆yi,t−1.




i∆i] = 0, (9)
where W 0
i denotes a matrix of instruments. If the lagged di￿erence of the dependent
variable can be instrumented sensibly with its own lagged levels, equation (9) holds
and we can reject the presence of a correlation between di￿erenced error terms and
instruments.
In addition to the correlation problem of yi,t prevalent by construction of the
di￿erence estimator, we have to address the concern that our explanatory variables
FDV and FDQ are potentially also correlated with the error due to reverse causal-
ity. In principle, any measure of ￿nancial development is potentially endogeneous.
15Note, that taking ￿rst di￿erences does not a￿ect estimated coe￿cients as these are identical in
equations (7) and (8). We report below estimated coe￿cients with variable labels in levels according
to equation (7).
8Especially the volume of credit may well be explained by expanding economic activ-
ity rather than vice versa. Thus, we have to identify suitable instruments for FDV
and FDQ.16
The appropriateness of the chosen instruments can be validated by a test on the
validity of the moment restrictions. The Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions
represents such a test on the moment conditions formulated in equation (9) with
the null-hypothesis H0 that moment conditions are not systematically violated.
Specifying ￿nancial development as exogenous, predetermined or endogenous
variables and using alternative instruments respectively, allows us to test which
choice of instruments for ￿nancial development is appropriate. 17 Let us turn before-
hand to our approach to measure the quality e￿ect of ￿nancial development.
3.2 Intermediation Quality
Our approach to devise a measure of intermediation quality is inspired by Lucchetti
et al. (2001) and Berger et al. (2004). We approximate the quality of banks to
perform their intermediation function by the e￿ciency of banks to employ resources
when generating ￿nancial products and services.
The intuition behind this proxy unfolds as follows. We regard the main task
of a bank to channel funds from savers to investors, to allocate them to the most
pro￿table projects and to act as a delegated monitor after investment. Therefore, we
consider in line with Sealey and Lindley (1977) the monetary volume intermediated
as output O. When conducting their intermediation function, we assume that banks
minimize cost, C. This requires them to use input quantities, Q, such as labor
and deposits, in optimal proportions to produce a portfolio of outputs, for example
interbank versus corporate loans. Under the assumption that banks are price-takers
in factor markets, optimal input proportions depend on relative input prices, P.
Bank ine￿ciency arises when managers employ simply too much input quantities
and/or allocate them in wrong proportions.
Let us illustrate the link between e￿ciency and the quality of ￿nancial services
provided with an example. If banks are better developed, we would expect that
they hire the optimal amount of risk managers and credit o￿cers given their choice
of a loan portfolio to supply and respective wages. Assume that a bank granted
relatively many corporate loans, which we assume to be on average more risky
compared to interbank loans. Consider now a management that hires too few (or
not appropriately trained) credit o￿cers to monitor these exposures and also too few
risk managers to price the loan during the negotiations prior to lending appropriately.
This may save the bank labor costs in the short run. But if the bank consistently
16If explanatory variables are correlated with past and contemporaneous errors E[Xi,t,i,s] 6= 0
for s ≤ t, we refer to the variable as endogenous. Then, using ￿rst di￿erences requires us to use
levels lagged by two periods or more as instruments. In contrast, predetermined variables are
contemporaneously uncorrelated with the errors E[Xi,t,i,s] 6= 0 for s < t and present realizations
depend only on past shocks. Thus, is su￿ces to instrument predetermined variables with their
levels lagged by one period.
17Note, however, that this tests cannot rule out the conceptual question of reverse causality.
Ultimately, the decision to specify GDP to depend on ￿nancial development can only be rooted in
theory.
9underprices riskier loans, subsequent defaults will result in write-o￿s of bad loans,
thereby increasing cost and ultimately leading to ine￿ciency. 18 As a second example,
banks may simply employ too much of an input. Spending on buildings and other
￿xed assets may be too high if managers negotiate rents poorly or if they are more
interested in prestigious o￿ces. Such a bank is then identi￿ed as ine￿cient compared
to the industry.19
We estimate cost e￿ciency with stochastic frontier analysis. A bank produces
three outputs: interbank and commercial loans, O1 and O2, respectively, and secu-
rities, O3. To this end, it demands three inputs subject to given prices, P, and the
technology constraint, T(O,Q,Z), which also contains equity, Z. A bank employs
￿xed assets, Q1, labor, Q2, and borrowed funds, Q3. We account for technological
change with a time trend t (Baltagi and Gri￿n, 1988). We specify the cost frontier
using the translog functional form and write the reduced form as: 20
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(10)
In any year t, a bank k can deviate from optimal cost due to random noise, vkt,
or ine￿cient use of in- and outputs, ukt. To distinguish these two e￿ects, we specify
a composed total error, εkt. For a cost frontier, ine￿ciency leads to above frontier
costs. Therefore, the total error is εkt = ukt + vkt. The random error term vkt is
assumed iid with vkt ∼ N(0,σ2
v) and independent of the explanatory variables. The
ine￿ciency term is iid with ukt ∼ N|(0,σ2
u)| and independent of the vkt. It is drawn
from a non-negative distribution truncated at zero. 21
In contrast to Lucchetti et al. (2001) and Berger et al. (2004), we follow Greene
(2005) and use a bank-speci￿c ￿xed e￿ects stochastic frontier model with time-
variant ine￿ciency to estimate the parameters in equation (10). This is important
because Bos et al. (2005) show that systematic di￿erences across banks that are
18Alternatively, if the bank consistently overprices, it will loose the business to competitors. This
would imply comparatively high labor cost in relation to relatively small volumes of funds and,
thus, high ine￿ciency, too.
19See Hughes et al. (2003) for evidence on bank manager’s desire to build empires.
20We impose the necessary homogeneity and symmetry restrictions as in Lang and Welzel (1999).
21Note that ine￿ciency can vary over time but is not further speci￿ed to follow any particular
trend over time.
10not due to ine￿ciency must be accounted for in e￿ciency analyses. Such systematic
di￿erences are likely to exist even within one economy only, let alone in cross-country
studies like that of Berger et al. (2004).
Non-random di￿erences of banks’ costs that are not due to ine￿ciency are here
captured by the bank-speci￿c ￿xed e￿ect, αk.22 Subsequently, we obtain bank-
speci￿c e￿ciency measures with the method suggested by Jondrow et al. (1982).
We use the conditional distribution of u given ε and a point estimator of technical
e￿ciency is given by E(uk|εk), i.e. the mean of uk given εk. Cost e￿ciency (FDQ)
is calculated as [exp(−ukt)] and equals one for a fully e￿cient bank. Likewise, FDQ
of 0.9 implies that a bank could have produced an identical output vector with 90
percent of actually incurred cost.
We argue that our FDQ measure enjoys three major advantages compared to the
traditional approaches in the ￿nance-growth literature. First, it is a much more direct
measure of resources wasted during the intermediation process due to suboptimal
allocation and use of input factors in the vein of Leibenstein (1966). It therefore
resembles the η component of ￿nancial development mentioned in Pagano (1993)
much closer compared to the intermediated credit volume employed traditionally.
Second, we estimate a long-run cost frontier, which covers operational costs in-
clusive of those costs arising from writing o￿ non-performing loans. Deviations from
optimal costs therefore capture the long-run (dis-)ability of bankers to ful￿l their
intermediation task e￿ciently. We argue that this holistic assessment of bank per-
formance captures the ability to gather information both ex ante and ex post more
appropriately compared to a proxy of the volume intermediated. This is because
systematic and sustained failure to optimize the production process in light of these
core functions of successful bankers, will result in higher than industry cost. Hence,
we think that our FDQ measure also captures the in￿uence of ￿nancial development
on A to a better extent compared to the sheer size of the ￿nancial industry.
Third, the relative ability to convert inputs into outputs is less prone to critique
regarding reverse causality. In section 3.1 we pointed out that cross-sectional esti-
mation fails to distinguish whether large volumes of bank credit, that is bank size,
cause economic growth or rather result from it. While the use of instruments in our
dynamic panel model alleviates the problem, FDQ enjoys the conceptual advantage
that it is a relative measure. More speci￿cally, we assume that the transformation
technology T(·) is identical for all banks operating in Germany. At the same time,
we account simultaneously through αk for systematic di￿erences across banks, such
as size or banking sector. Our quality proxy of ￿nancial development, FDQ, is there-
fore independent of the credit volume of an individual bank because the e￿ciency of
a bank does not depend on how much output it produces but rather how well it does
so. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that the sustained ability of individual
banks to exploit its resources given the available technology as e￿cient as possi-
ble does not depend per se on whether the economy is contracting or expanding.
Intuitively, the performance of bankers to minimize costs when supplying ￿nancial
services should foster growth independent of the question whether the intermediated
volume is small or large.
As noted earlier in our growth speci￿cation, the Arellano-Bond estimator allows
22The αk’s are allowed to be correlated with Okt,Wkt and Zkt (Greene, 2005).
11us to test the validity of our empirical speci￿cation in the light of the potential
endogeneity of the ￿nancial development indicators more formally below. Before
turning to our results, we brie￿y discuss our data sources and de￿ned variables.
3.3 Data and Variables
Growth Macroeconomic data per district ("Kreis") are obtained from State and
Federal Statistical O￿ces, respectively. 23 These data are available on an annual
basis between 1994 and 2003. The Federal O￿ce for Building and Regional Plan-
ning ("Bundesbeh￿ ￿rde f￿r Bauwesen und Raumordnung" ) provided us with a key to
map these political regions, namely districts, to economic planning regions ( "Raum-
ordnungsregionen, ROR" ) in Germany. The latter consist of multiple districts and
represent the o￿ce’s taxonomy. It is based on economic interdependencies as ap-
proximated by commuters within economic agglomeration areas. 24 Niebuhr (2001)
argues that the use of economic planing regions is signi￿cantly superior due to their
de￿nition by economic criteria compared to political regions provided by the sta-
tistical o￿ces.25 Our data comprise all 97 ROR in Germany and we use GDP per
worker, Y , as dependent variable.26
Financial development We use balance sheet and pro￿t and loss account data
for all private and public banks that reported to the Bundesbank between 1993 and
2004. As noted earlier, we measure the quantity of ￿nancial development FDV as
the amount of loans and securities over GDP. The quality of ￿nancial intermediation
FDQ is approximated by cost e￿ciency, measured with stochastic frontier analysis.
After estimating FDQ for each bank in every year, we allocate bank-speci￿c vari-
ables to their respective ROR via the location of the head o￿ce of the bank. Given
the de jure principle of regional demarcation of German public banks as well as the
de facto regionally limited range of activity of small commercial and virtually all
cooperative banks, bank speci￿c indicators should accurately describe both quality
and quantity of ￿nancial intermediation within a respective ROR. We conduct two
plausibility checks regarding the defensibility of this approach. First, we use data
on the large credit register of the Bundesbank ( "Millionenkreditevidenz" ) to obtain
the percentage share of loans larger than 1.5 million Euros granted within the re-
gions ("Ortsnummer") classi￿ed by the Bundesbank. While not identical to ROR
this classi￿cation provides the closest alternative. 27 On average, local savings and
cooperative banks grant 80 percent of their loan portfolio to customers within the
Bundesbank regions. Even for commercial banks the local lending share is still at
around 30 percent. This supports our approach to allocate banks on the basis of their
head quarters. As a second check we use available information on bank branches to
23These regions resemble the NUTS 3 level of the data assembled by Eurostat.
24We also employed data on the district and state level to check our estimations for robustness.
While results are qualitatively similar, we consider our choice of RORs superior to other regions in
order to minimize spatial correlations and poor asymptotic properties of our estimator for small
cross-sections.
25An alternative regional dimension to analyze growth in Germany are labor market regions as
in Kosfeld et al. (2005) and German Council of Economic Advisors (2004).
26Alternatively, we checked the robustness of our results using gross value added per worker.
Furthermore, we also checked dependent variables per capita.
27German banks have to report each loan beyond the mentioned size to the Bundesbank indi-
cating the debtor and his geographical location.
12examine the regional activities of banks. Only very few banks maintain networks in
more than one ROR. In fact, the branch network of savings and cooperative banks
is highly concentrated within their respective ROR. While 93 percent of all coop-
erative banks’ branches are located within the ROR of the head o￿ce, the branch
network of saving banks is even more concentrated with 97 percent of all branches
located within the same ROR. Despite these supporting indications we still consider
national banks undertaking their business across ROR to present a di￿culty since
a precise allocation of their activities remains impractical. This is also con￿rmed by
the branch distribution of nationally active banks. The share of branches within the
same ROR of large commercial banks, small commercial banks and Landesbanken
is 5, 31 and 45 percent, respectively. Therefore, we estimate below our preferred
speci￿cation also after excluding all nationally active banks. 28
Controls To control for the accumulation of human capital, HC, we use the ratio
of student enrollment in the upper secondary school relative to total students. As in
King and Levine (1993) we consider capital depreciation δ to be constant at 5 percent
and we specify population growth as the change of the employed population. We
de￿ne the joint variable as ETG in our estimated regressions.29 Finally, we amend
control variables for the structure of local banking markets. In our results section
we present estimations that use either the mean market share per ROR or the
local Hirschman-Her￿ndahl-Index as proxies for competition. Variable descriptions,
sources and summary statistics are depicted in table 5 in the appendix.
4 Results
Speci￿cation Choices We consider two speci￿cation choices most important when es-
timating the growth model as presented in equation (7). First, we need to investigate
if our quality and quantity measures of ￿nancial development should be speci￿ed
as exogenous, predetermined or endogenous variables. Clearly, the di￿erentiation of
a variable as endogenous or predetermined should be model driven. The approach
pursued here is to let the Sargan test validate whether the imposed moment con-
ditions determined by the choice of instruments are systematically violated when
our measures of ￿nancial development are speci￿ed as endogenous, predetermined
or exogenous.30 Second, we are concerned with potential problems due to serial cor-
relation and an adequate lag-structure of level variables used as instruments for our
lagged endogenous variable yi,t−1.
Consider ￿rst the Sargan test, which provides a mean to test the appropriateness
of speci￿ed instruments for the lagged dependent and especially ￿nancial develop-
ment indicators (Arellano and Bond (1991)). If it is true that ￿nancial development
merely results from an increased demand for ￿nancial funds in an expanding econ-
omy, the speci￿cation of FDV and/or FDQ as exogenous variables yields biased and
inconsistent estimates due to their contemporaneous correlation with the error term.
28These are large commercial banks, Landesbanken and central cooperative banks.
29In analogy to the speci￿cation of GDP per capita we also employed population growth here as
well. We also checked the robustness of our results for alternative values for δ, ranging in increments
of 50 basis points between 2.5 to 7.5 percent. By and large, results were not qualitatively a￿ected.
30See footnote 16 for the choice of instruments for predetermined and endogenous variables.
13Table 1: Comparison of Speci￿cation Choices
Quality Quantity
Sargan [chi2]: Exogenous Predetermined Endogenous
Exogenous 56.01** 87,44 82,99
(0.01) (0.22) (0.14)
Predetermined 88,83 95.61 95,28
(0.19) (0.96) (0.89)
Endogenous 82,9 94,2 93,35
(0.14) (0.9) (0.79)
Sargan [df.]: Exogenous Predetermined Endogenous
Exogenous 35 78 70
Predetermined 78 121 113
Endogenous 70 113 105
AR2 [z-value]:
Exogenous -1,28 -1,3 -1,42
(0.20) (0.19) (0.15)
Predetermined -1,27 -1,26 -1,38
(0.20) (0.21) (0.17)
Endogenous (-1.22) -1,27 -1,39
(0.22) (0.21) (0.16)
Notes: p-values in brackets.
***, **, * denotes signi￿cance at the 1, 5, 10 percent level.
This would be indicated by the Sargan test since equation (9) is no longer ful￿lled.
We may treat ￿nancial development alternatively as predetermined or endogenous
variables which implies the use of alternative lagged levels instruments. If such as
speci￿cation ful￿lls the notion that the expected correlation between contempora-
neous errors and instruments is not systematically di￿erent from zero, we interpret
the e￿ect of ￿nancial development due to its direct e￿ect on growth. In the predeter-
mined case, an acceptance of the H0 under the Sargan test indicates that ￿nancial
development is at least contemporaneously uncorrelated with the error term.
We therefore estimate the baseline model in equation (7) using the two-step
GMM estimator.31 Consider the nine respective Sargan test statistics in table 1 that
represent all possible combinations as how to specify the quality and the quantity of
￿nancial intermediation, respectively. 32 In the upper panel of table 1 we depict the
three possible speci￿cation choices of FDV in columns and the respective options
for FDQ in rows.
In the upper left cell of table 1 we depict the case to simultaneously specify
31In terms of table 5 the employed variables are: Y1, FDQ, FDV , HC and ETG.
32Arellano and Bond (1991) show that the one-step Sargan test over-rejects in the presence of
heteroscedasticity and therefore formulate a consistent two-step estimator. However, Arellano and
Bond (1991) also note that standard errors of individual coe￿cients from the two-step estimator
su￿er from a downward bias. Therefore, we focus here only on test statistics based on the two-step
estimator as these are suited for speci￿cation choices. We report coe￿cients subsequently on the
basis of one-step estimates to draw inference.
14both indicators of ￿nancial development as exogenous variables. The according Sar-
gan statistic rejects this speci￿cations on the basis of a systematic violation of the
moment conditions. This speci￿cation indicates that ￿nancial development is not
independent of growth.
Regarding the remaining options as how to specify these indicators, our results
indicate across the whole range, that at least one of the two variables needs to be
instrumented. Notably, it is statistically irrelevant which of the two is chosen. Also
note that it is statistically permissable to specify one or both indicators either as
predetermined or as endogenous variable. For any combination, the Sargan test is
insigni￿cant and does not reject the set of instruments chosen.
Our prime conclusion regarding this result is to acknowledge that the use of
estimators using suitable instruments is necessary. Inference from analyses that fail
to instrument ￿nancial development indicators of either kind must be treated with
great care.33
Another conclusion of this result is that econometric guidance alone does not
provide a clear-cut picture. We therefore motivate our speci￿cation choice based on
our view that the relative nature of our FDQ measure supports the notion of strict
exogeneity. In contrast, on grounds of potentially higher demand for ￿nancial funds
as a consequence of higher growth, we regard the FDV e￿ect of ￿nancial development
at least as predetermined. Henceforth, reported results therefore instrument FDV
as a predetermined and include FDQ as exogenous variable.34
To ease, however, a comparison to the most frequently encountered approaches in
the literature consider table 2. We present coe￿cient estimates for two estimations.
In the ￿rst column we specify both FDV and FDQ as exogenous variables, the second
depicts our preferred baseline speci￿cation where only the former is instrumented.
The results indicate that our measure of the quality of ￿nancial development is not
a￿ected by choosing to instrument both proxies as predetermined variables. 35
Second, we consider brie￿y the issue of serial correlation. As discussed in section
3.1, taking ￿rst di￿erences and rewriting equation (7) implies that the error term
∆t su￿ers from serial correlation by construction, which is unproblematic given our
di￿erence estimator.36 However, we must not observe any autocorrelation of higher
order as to avoid inconsistent and biased estimates. For all possible combinations of
FDQ and FDV discussed above, the bottom panel in table 1 reports according test
statistics and p-values. The results provide evidence that second-order autocorrela-
tion does not present a problem.
Variable Choice We consider next alternative dependent variables y and addi-
33We also estimated the growth speci￿cation with alternative estimators, ranging from simple
cross-sectional and pooled OLS to ￿xed e￿ect panel estimators. These robustness checks further
underpinned our conclusion that dynamic panel estimators using appropriate instruments are key
to the analysis.
34We checked subsequent regressions systematically across all nine speci￿cation choices depicted
in table 1. Bearing the well-known sensitivity of instrumental GMM for dynamic panels in mind,
our results were surprisingly robust.
35We refrain at this stage from interpreting single coe￿cients in more depth since we concentrate
￿rst on our speci￿cation choices. Instead, we ask the reader to bear with us for a few more pages
until we discuss individual estimates.
36This is con￿rmed by tests for an AR(1) process which we do not report here.















AR1 [z-value]: -2.19** -2.00**
AR2 [z-value]: -1.47 -1.56
Robust standard errors in brackets
***, **, * denotes signi￿cance at the 1, 5, 10 percent level.
tional control variables x in the baseline regression. Table 3 presents results based on
the one-step AB estimator with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. Column
(1) contains the baseline regression using GDP per worker as dependent variable. In
line with our expectations, the coe￿cient of FDQ is signi￿cant and positive. An im-
provement of 1 percent of the quality of ￿nancial intermediation furthers economic
growth by about 0.09 percent. With regard to FDV we ￿nd that the coe￿cient is
insigni￿cant and negative. This stands in contrast to the evidence presented in the
￿nance-growth literature. The result suggests that merely increasing the amount of
bank loans has no signi￿cant impact on growth. Potentially, the amount of funds
provided by banks to ￿nance investment projects is not in short supply. Then, in-
creasing the volume of potentially available funds for investment exerts per se no
growth impetus.37 In contrast, an improvement of the ability to put these available
funds to use in the sense of selecting and monitoring investment projects indeed
helps to promote growth.
With regard to the control variables, we ￿nd that human capital ( HC) and the
growth of the working population (ETG) exhibit signs in line with expectations
and are statistically signi￿cant. The former exhibits a positive coe￿cient, which
implies that faster accumulation of know-how feeds economic growth. The latter
yields the result that higher population growth leads, cet. par., to reduced income
per capita. The result for human capital is in line with previous ￿ndings in the
literature. However, Kosfeld et al. (2005) fail to detect any e￿ect with regard to the
37Since most banks in Germany are either voluntarily or due to imposed regulation acting in
con￿ned regions only, this result may also indicate a lack of possibilities to diversify loan portfolios
to customers outside their regions. If, for example, macroeconomic shocks are region-speci￿c, there
is little a bank obliged to lend only within it’s region can do. Any increase of loan volumes is likely
to be channelled to creditors more or less equally su￿ering from poor economic conditions.
16Table 3: Alternative dependent and additional control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnYi,t−1 0.605*** 0.595*** 0.604*** 0.601***
[0.032] [0.033] [0.032] [0.031]
lnHC 0.064*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.063***
[0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015]
lnFDV -0.009 -0.017 -0.009 -0.017
[0.011] [0.012] [0.012] [0.013]
lnFDQ 0.087** 0.082** 0.078** 0.076*
[0.041] [0.040] [0.038] [0.039]
lnETG -0.020*** -0.024*** -0.020*** -0.020***





Constant 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.007***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Wald [chi2]: 671.43 602.11 659.6 690.68
Sargan [chi2]: 87.44 88.41 86.41 88.51
Sargan [p-value]: 0.22 0.20 0.24 0.22
AR1 [z-value]: -2.00** -2.02** -2.03** -2.03**
AR2 [z-value]: -1.56 -1.67* -1.55 -1.49
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. AB One-Step Estimation.
Sargan test from Two-Step Estimator.
***, **, * denotes signi￿cance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level.
growth of the working population. 38
The results remain qualitatively similar for alternative variables. Column (2) is
based on the same regression using gross value added per worker as dependent vari-
able. The coe￿cients remain largely unchanged while we reject the null hypothesis
of no second-order autocorrelation at the 10 percent level. Thus, the results based
on gross value added per worker are potentially biased and inconsistent. In column
(3) and (4) of table 3 we add further variables about the structure of local bank-
ing markets. Column (3) contains the Her￿ndahl-Hirschman index on the basis of
total assets per ROR. The regression in column (4) includes the average market
share of banks per ROR. Both measures are proxies for market power. The coe￿-
cients for both proxies are insigni￿cant and have no e￿ect on our result for ￿nancial
development.
Regional versus national banks Next, we analyze if the identi￿ed quality e￿ect
of ￿nancial development is driven by a potential failure to appropriately allocate
the activities of national banks to separate regions. While the majority of German
banks are small and undertake their business within a limited geographical area,
some operate on a nation-wide basis (Koetter et al., 2004).
Local banks comprise primarily savings and cooperative banks but also smaller
38We also run regressions using the growth of the total population and also found a signi￿cant
and negative impact on growth.
17commercial banks. To account for the unavailability of regional income distributions
of nationally active banks, we therefore exclude this group when constructing our
indicators for ￿nancial development. The respective results in column (1) of table 4
indicate the same positive and signi￿cant e￿ect of FDQ and an insigni￿cant e￿ect
of FDV for local banks.39 Consequently, our results are not driven by the inclusion
of large banks.
Table 4: Financial development across banking groups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnYi,t−1 0.584*** 0.481*** 0.626*** 0.544***
[0.027] [0.040] [0.028] [0.049]
lnETG -0.020*** -0.017*** -0.021*** -0.018***
[0.004] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003]
lnHC 0.052*** 0.046*** 0.060*** 0.047***






















Constant 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.006***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Wald [chi2]: 692.99 686.76 758.25 749.39
Sargan [chi2]: 87.12 90.59 83.98 88.23
Sargan [p-value]: 0.22 0.98 0.30 0.20
AR1 [z-value]: -2.21** -2.57** -2.05** -2.61***
AR2 [z-value]: -1.75* -1.42 -1.97** -1.6
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. AB One-Step Estimation.
Sargan tests from AB Two-Step Estimation.
***, **, * denotes signi￿cance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level.
Note that speci￿cation (1) still incorporates small commercial banks. One may
object the assumption that the business of small commercial banks is limited to a
geographical area similar to that of public and private banks from the cooperative
sector. Since there is no possibility to verify the geographical scope of activity for
the group of small commercial banks, we further reduce our sample to construct
￿nancial development indicators.
39In addition, we excluded RORs, which host most of such nationally active banks, namely
the regions hosting the cities of Frankfurt a.M., Munich and Stuttgart. Results are qualitatively
identical and we conclude that our ￿ndings are not driven by these regional "banking centers".
Intuitively, this is not too surprising if one realizes that even the ￿ve largest banks in Germany
have together only a very small market share of around 17 percent.
18Consider to this end column (2), where we estimate our baseline speci￿cation
with measures of ￿nancial development that are derived for public and cooperative
banks only. Because both groups are active in all ROR in all years, we test for
asymmetries by including our FDQ and FDV variables for each pillar separately.
While we still ￿nd that the coe￿cient of FDQ is positive for both banking groups,
it is, however, only statistically discernable from zero for the group of cooperative
banks.
One potential explanation is that a change in the e￿ciency of savings banks
has no signi￿cant growth impact due to an already higher level compared to other
banks. However, our summary statistics for cost e￿ciency per region indicate no
such di￿erences in the data.40
Therefore, we are more inclined to hypothesize that it may well be possible that
the role of savings banks, or more precisely the relation between their e￿ciency
and local growth, is simply too di￿erent in the regions of Germany to yield a com-
mon coe￿cient on FDQ in table 4 that is statistically signi￿cant for the whole of
the economy.41 Note, however, that statistical signi￿cance need not preclude eco-
nomic signi￿cance. Perhaps, the role of public banks is particularly important in
less well endowed regions while it is markedly less relevant for growth in already
better developed regions of the German economy. This is supported by a test on the
equality of the coe￿cients for e￿ciency of both pillars which we cannot reject. It is
thus possible that savings banks e￿ciency have a similar impact on local growth. 42
While we cannot accept such a hypothesis on the basis of our analysis, such a result
would be fairly in line with earlier studies distinguishing between developed and
less-developed countries on the one hand and private and public banks on the other
(Rioja and Valev, 2004; Galindo and Micco, 2004). In our view, therefore, the role of
public banks in general and the apparent heterogeneity in German banking requires
further research.
Finally we note that the systematic di￿erence of FDQ for these two banking
groups is con￿rmed in columns (3) and (4). We estimate for each pillar separately
and the result for cooperative banks implies that a sheer expansion of ￿nancial
quantity of cooperative banks is to the detriment of income per worker. 43 Clearly,
we do not model here whether the volume of cooperative bank loans is supply or
demand driven. But what we infer from our results is that larger volumes do not
promote growth. Instead, an improvement in the quality of ￿nancial intermediation
is the variable that indicates a positive e￿ect on income per worker.
40Mean e￿ciency for both banking groups is around 74 % and the standard deviation of e￿ciency
for savings banks even exceeds that of cooperative banks.
41We check to this end for each ROR the correlation between Y and FDQ of savings and coop-
erative banks, respectively. While mean correlations are virtually identical, the standard deviation
of correlations for savings is indeed 50 percent larger compared to that of cooperative banks.
42In fact, estimating two regionally separated models (East versus West and regions above versus
below median GDP per worker in 1993) yields that savings bank e￿ciency in poorer regions is
indeed signi￿cant. While those estimates are available upon request from the authors, we do not
depict them here since speci￿cation tests do not allow us to draw statistically ￿rm inference.
43As in the case of FDQ, the coe￿cient for savings banks points into the same direction but is
statistically insigni￿cant.
195 Conclusion
We provide in this paper evidence on the ￿nance-growth nexus for the regions of
Germany. Using data for the 97 economic planning regions ( "Raumordnungsregio-
nen, ROR") and all banks operating in the Republic, we distinguish two di￿erent
channels of ￿nancial development: a Hicksian volume e￿ect FDV and a quality ef-
fect FDQ of ￿nancial development in the vein of Schumpeter. We introduce an
improved measure for the latter: microeconomic cost e￿ciency measured for each
bank individually. Our main results are the following ￿ve.
First, our evidence supports the notion that the quality of ￿nancial intermedia-
tion as measured by cost e￿ciency of individual banks signi￿cantly a￿ects growth.
A one-percent increase in cost e￿ciency spurs GDP per worker by 0.09 percent.
Second, the traditional proxy of credit volume to GDP used in most ￿nance-
growth studies receives no statistical support for our sample. In most speci￿cations,
an expanding amount of bank credit has no signi￿cant e￿ect on growth.
Third, we ￿nd evidence that both measures of ￿nancial development must not
be speci￿ed simultaneously as exogenous explanatory variable. We ￿nd that the
use of instrumental variable estimators is necessary. However, by choosing suitable
instruments we are able to obtain unbiased and consistent estimates.
Fourth, our results remain robust after excluding those banks from the construc-
tion of our ￿nancial development indicator that operate nationally and can therefore
not be allocated to single regions with complete certainty. Nonetheless, after includ-
ing FDQ and FDV only for local banks from each pillar, it is only the former e￿ect
of ￿nancial development that a￿ects growth signi￿cantly and positively.
Fifth, both the quality and quantity e￿ect is signi￿cant for cooperative banks
only. In general, the results lead us to conclude that it is not the volume of funds,
which is in short supply in Germany’s region. In fact, the positive e￿ect of FDQ on
growth suggests that economic expansion requires better but not necessarily more
banking.
Two important caveats deserve mention. First, the negative and mostly insignif-
icant coe￿cient found for lending volume may merely re￿ect the maturity of the
German economy and could actually indicate an excess supply of credit (German
Council of Economic Advisors, 2004). However, such inference would require the ex-
plicit modelling of the credit market as to determine if the observed level of aggregate
loans indeed re￿ects the equilibrium level or not. Second, the lack of statistical signif-
icance of savings banks’ e￿ciency need not imply economic insigni￿cance. Rather,
it may merely re￿ect the need to account more explicitly for potentially alterna-
tive roles played by these banks in di￿erent stages of economic development across
regions at a given point in time.
Here, we remain in line with the existing ￿nance growth literature and deem
both issues out of the present paper’s scope. But our results indicate that, ￿rst,
the channels of ￿nancial development are conceptually di￿erent and, second, this
di￿erence can be taken into account by using e￿ciency as a more explicit proxy for
the quality e￿ects ￿nancial development has on growth.
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246 Appendix
Table 5: Summary Statistics for Growth and Stochastic Frontier Analysis Variables
Variable Description Unit N Mean SD Source
Growth regression
Y1 GDP per worker e 776 49,016 7,708 FSO/SSO
Y2 Gross value added per worker e 776 45,737 7,151 FSO/SSO
FDQ Bank loans and securities to GDP % 776 98.9 125.5 BBK
FDV Cost e￿ciency % 776 74.3 2.4 BBK
ETG Growth rate employed % 776 0.18 1.43 FSO/SSO
POPG Growth rate population % 776 0.05 0.02 FSO/SSO
HC Secondary school pupil to total pupil % 776 22.0 3.9 FSO/SSO
HHI Hirschman-Her￿ndahl-Index Pts 776 151 241 BBK
MS Mean market share % 776 6.0 5.0 BBK
I Change in bank liabilities to GDP % 776 2.3 10.0 BBK
Stochastic cost frontier
O1 Interbank loans Me 34,188 382 4,440 BBK
O2 Commercial loans Me 34,188 757 6,920 BBK
O3 Securities and bonds Me 34,188 365 3,900 BBK
W1 Price of ￿xed assets % 34,188 23.2 469.4 BBK
W2 Price of labor Te 34,188 51.5 151.4 BBK
W3 Price of borrowed funds % 34,188 3.94 25.51 BBK
Z Equity Me 34,188 58.4 507.0 BBK
TOC Total operating cost Me 34,188 84.0 767.0 BBK
Notes: Me: millions of Euro; Te: thousands of Euro; %: percentages; FSO and SSO:
Federal and State Statistical O￿ces, respectively; BBK: Deutsche Bundesbank.
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